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Chapter V 
Social dialogue for decent work 
Sarosh Kuruvilla 
Executive summary 
The goal of this paper is to develop measures (indicators) of social 
dialogue to help assess the progress of nations on this important dimen-
sion of Decent Work. The ILO's definition of social dialogue covers various 
types of information exchange (e.g. negotiation or consultation), between 
representatives of governments, employers and workers, on any issue of 
common interest, and includes both bipartite and tripartite mechanisms. 
However, partly because the ILO's structure is tripartite, tripartism has 
been seen as the primary avenue for social dialogue. 
More recently, the growing size of the informal sector, the continuing 
decline in the living standards of large sections of the world's population, 
and the decline in union density internationally, have all prompted the 
ILO to articulate the concept of Decent Work, comprising four basic prin-
ciples or core rights that are universally applicable. Since social dialogue 
is one of these core labour rights, there is renewed interest in developing 
measures or indicators of social dialogue. 
The paper argues that any effort to develop measures of the social 
dialogue concept should take account of its current limitations. First, over-
whelmingly, social dialogue has been operationalized in terms of collective 
bargaining between employers and workers (bipartite), and social concer-
tation, i.e., tripartite talks between representatives of labour, employers, 
and governments. Other actors (e.g. civil society) have been ignored in 
this process. Second, there is no guarantee that collective bargaining 
rights do in fact lead to discussions about social policy at national level, 
although this is implied in the ILO's practice of developing social dialogue. 
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Third, the focus on "representatives" is also limiting, in that great num-
bers of the world's workers (and in some cases, employers) do not have 
the right to representation, which raises the question of how the practice 
of social dialogue could apply to these populations. Finally, there is the 
implicit assumption that an "employment relationship" between workers 
and employers is necessary for social dialogue to occur. This assumption 
excludes large numbers of workers who are in the informal sector, or who 
are self-employed, or in contractual relationships, since social dialogue as 
currently defined does not apply to them. Any attempt to develop meas-
ures must be sensitive to these problems. 
Numerous efforts have been made to develop measures and indica-
tors of social dialogue (these are reviewed in the paper). Overwhelmingly, 
the focus has been on the rights underlying bipartite collective bargaining 
and the way it is actually practised. Measures regarding the rights and 
practice of tripartism have also been developed, but these have largely 
been based on research in Western Europe (the one region of the world in 
which tripartism is significantly developed). The advantages and problems 
of the various different measures that have been used in prior efforts are 
also examined in the present report. 
The design of the social dialogue indicators described here takes 
account of the conceptual problems mentioned above as well as the lessons 
learned from previous approaches. The guiding principles are as follows: 
the measures developed must be linked with earlier approaches to preserve 
continuity; measures of the rights underpinning social dialogue are clearly 
necessary but they are not sufficient, as we need good measures of the 
actual practice of social dialogue as well; since social dialogue is a com-
plicated process, there is also a need for subjective interpretations of the 
elements involved by experts who have an intimate knowledge of national 
systems: the measures developed must take account of the large portions 
of the world's population who do not have representation rights, as well as 
those who are not in traditional employment relationships; the measures 
must be dynamic, comprehensive, valid and transparent; and finally, the 
costs involved in collecting data for the measures and the actual assess-
ment exercise must be lower than those required for alternative forms such 
as national surveys. 
The methodology advocated here involves the creation of "National 
Social Dialogue Data Sheets" that incorporate information on 28 quan-
titative and qualitative indicators/measures of social dialogue. Section 4 
of the paper defines each indicator and provides a detailed justification 
for including it in the overall assessment instrument. The National Social 
Dialogue Data Sheets should be prepared by national or regional experts, 
who should also carry out the basic research required to collect, analyse 
and present this information. Each National Social Dialogue Data Sheet 
will thus reflect the state of so> 
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will thus reflect the state of social dialogue in the country concerned and 
also indicate ways in which it could be improved. In that sense, these are 
dynamic, rather than static indicators. To increase uniformity in the data 
sheets, detailed guidelines are developed for national experts in respect 
of each indicator. These guidelines mitigate problems with the subjective 
interpretation of labour and industrial relations institutions and the way 
they operate (an essential aspect of social dialogue in practice), since they 
provide a stable comparative basis on which national experts can make 
their evaluations. 
The approach taken in developing this framework of 28 indicators 
deals with the conceptual issues noted above as well as the problems with 
prior approaches. It is comprehensive, since it covers the rights under-
pinning social dialogue as well as the actual practice; it is reliable since 
it draws upon experts who know social dialogue practices well in each 
country or region; it is cost efficient, since it is cheaper than carrying out 
national surveys in every country; it is relatively simple to understand; it is 
real, given that the measures are based on the variation in rights and prac-
tices in the world rather than on abstract and unmeasurable concepts; and 
it is dynamic in that it shows how each country could improve on different 
dimensions of social dialogue. A unique aspect of this approach is that each 
national data sheet is made up of both quantitative and qualitative infor-
mation that provides a broad picture of the operation of social dialogue in 
that country, but which does not permit crass (and needless) "comparative 
rankings of countries". Rather, the overall focus is on helping countries 
improve on social dialogue. The primary limitation of the approach is that 
some of the indicators for the unorganized and informal sectors are not 
very clearly specified, given the lack of research on the new alternative 
approaches to social dialogue that have emerged during the last decade. 
The paper concludes with a discussion on the tradeoffs between validity 
and reliability in the measures proposed. 
Introduction 
This paper aims to develop usable indicators of the concept of social 
dialogue, as part of the ILO's effort to develop operational measures of Decent 
Work. Section 1 examines the concept of social dialogue. Section 2 looks 
at past approaches to measuring social dialogue. Section 3 discusses what 
we have learned from past approaches and the implications for developing 
indicators and collecting data. Section 4 describes and justifies the proposed 
indicators. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the implica-
tions of this methodology for practice, and an examination of the costs. 
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1. The concept of social dialogue and decent work 
For the past six decades, the concept of social dialogue has been cen-
tral to the ILO's core mission and organization. Social dialogue is defined 
by the ILO to include: 
all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information 
between, or among, representatives of governments, employers and workers, 
on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy. It can 
exist as a tripartite process, with the government as an official party to 
the dialogue or it may consist of bipartite relations only between labour 
and management (or trade unions and employers' organizations), with or 
without indirect government involvement. Concertation can be informal or 
institutionalized, and often it is a combination of the two. It can take place 
at the national, regional or at enterprise level. It can be inter-professional, 
sectoral or a combination of all of these. The main goal of social dialogue 
itself is to promote consensus building and democratic involvement among 
the main stakeholders in the world of work.1 
While social dialogue as defined above encompasses both tripartite 
and bipartite relationships, in practice it is more closely linked to tripartism 
for a variety of institutional reasons. The conceptual glue linking social 
dialogue and tripartism is the notion of participation, which is funda-
mental to the tripartite structure of the ILO itself. 
Tripartism has assumed a centrality in the ILO that bipartism does 
not enjoy. However, the key problem with both concepts is that they define 
and often limit the ILO's sphere of influence. For instance, it can (and 
has) been argued that the traditional agents (employers' federations and 
trade unions) represent only a very small part of their constituencies. In 
particular, trade unions do not represent a significant percentage of the 
world's workforce. Although there is great variation in trade union densi-
ties (measured by union members as a percentage of the non-agricultural 
workforce) across the world, it is only in very few cases that unions repre-
sent a majority of the workforce (see table below). 
The data in the table are obviously not perfect, and do not include den-
sity figures from all countries. But the table is suggestive of the limitations of 
the concept of social dialogue and tripartism articulated by the ILO. First, a 
sizeable majority of the world's population does not have access to avenues 
for social dialogue. Second, and even more important, many non-European 
countries have not developed tripartite structures, given that bargaining is 
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Average union density and bargaining coverage 
Region No. of countries for Average 
which union density union 
data is available, density 
as of 1995 
Average collective 
bargaining coverage % 
for countries for which 
this data is available 
(number of countries) 
% of world 
population 
in each region 
(2000) 
Americas 
Asia and 
Oceania 
Europe 
Africa 
23 
16 
33 
25 
14.50 
15.58 
42.64 
14 
30.90 (12) 
18.53 (10) 
72.89 (13) 
30(8) 
13.7 
61.3 
12 
12.9 
Source: World Labour Report, ILO, 1997/8. 
decentralized in many nations. Third, even if we only look at the result of 
bipartite negotiation, collective bargaining coverage rates are low. Fourth, 
we must remember that most countries do not allow every member of the 
non-agricultural workforce to be represented by unions.. .there are signifi-
cant exclusions such as workers in small enterprises, workers in supervisory 
positions, workers earning above a threshold level of income, workers in 
essential industries, and workers in export processing zones. Finally, various 
data show that union membership all over the world has declined steadily 
during the last two decades (in some cases from a high base, in others from 
an already low base). Although the reasons for lack of union penetration or 
collective bargaining coverage are many, the basic conclusion from the table 
above is that only a minority of the world's population enjoys the right to 
social dialogue via tripartism or bipartism. 
Clearly, therefore, the traditional governance structures and the poli-
cies deriving from these structures were based on the assumption that 
urban industrial society (the organized sector) is an enduring model for job 
creation and worker protection. However, today's reality shows a growing 
"unorganized" sector in most developing nations. The ILO has not been 
blind to this reality, and through the ILO Declaration of 1998 and the sub-
sequent articulation of its decent work concept, the office is attempting to 
broaden its focus beyond the organized sector. The decent work approach 
is aimed at all workers, even those outside the organized sector. The main 
element is to establish a universal "social floor" based on four principles 
or core rights; freedom of association and effective recognition of the right 
to bargain, elimination of forced labour, abolition of the worst forms of 
child labour and elimination of discrimination. The concept of decent 
work requires institutions and rules in all nations to promote these rights. 
In the case of social dialogue, however, the ILO has not yet articulated 
new "pathways to the periphery", as its concept of social dialogue remains 
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rooted in traditional bipartite or tripartite terms, and its structure, pro-
grammes and projects continue to reflect that traditional orientation. 
The key problems are the low and declining levels of union density 
and the increasing proportion of the world's workers who do not have the 
right to participate (the concept underlying social dialogue). Since there 
is no sign at all of unions increasing their membership in most countries, 
worker participation must occur through alternative institutions or means. 
This is the "grey" area that the ILO has to consider in developing indica-
tors of social dialogue. 
The above background raises several fundamental questions. Must the 
concept of social dialogue be restricted to "representatives of governments, 
employers, and workers on issues of common interest relating to economic 
and social policy"? We have already pointed out that many workers do not 
or are not allowed to have representatives. Another question.. .do bipartite 
negotiations, which form the basis for collective bargaining in many coun-
tries, count as social dialogue since they do not involve the government 
or the general public? Yet another question....do bipartite negotiations 
ultimately lead to tripartite negotiations? The common element in these 
questions is that they hinge on the existence of representatives of employers 
and unions. This forces us to focus on social dialogue ONLY in arenas 
where such representation occurs. Second, focusing on representatives of 
employers and unions suggests that the employment relationship is at the core of 
social dialogue. The discussion that follows will explain in detail how these 
two concepts limit social dialogue. 
As long as the ILO defines social dialogue as "involving all types of 
negotiations, consultations, or exchange of information between or among 
representatives of employers and workers on issues of common interest 
relating to economic and social policy" (Jose, 2002, p. 2), then democrati-
cally elected trade unions are the best vehicle for providing workers with 
"voice" or participation. However, in the absence of the principal-agent 
relationship we need to cover alternative approaches. 
In many countries, individual workers have the right to raise industrial 
disputes. Arguably this provides individual workers with some degree of 
"voice" without "representation". However, this "voice" at the workplace 
does not necessarily provide workers with any voice over public policy that 
is of interest to them. Recently, a number of other alternatives have arisen, 
which do not require "representation by unions" but still provide employees 
with some degree of voice at work, and perhaps even in making policy rel-
evant to them. These include NGOs purporting to provide workers with 
some voice in decision making, through a variety of means, or corporate 
codes of conduct that lay down basic standards or guidelines for worker 
consultation, or regional-level guidelines and codes, voluntary industry 
codes and in a few cases, agreements on working conditions for factories 
where there is no union repres 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), th 
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where there is no union representation. Some examples include the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), the UN Global Compact and certification sys-
tems. There have also been efforts that look beyond labour-standards com-
pliance to worker development. Consider the following examples. There is 
an NGO called Global Alliance, a tri-sectoral alliance (World Bank, Nike, 
Gap, and Universities) which provides training to workers and supervisors 
in garment and sportswear factories. The partners offer worker education 
in a number of areas such as health, safety, nutrition, financial planning, 
communication skills, presentation skills, while simultaneously providing 
supervisory training to employers' representatives in the factories. As a 
result, some real "empowerment" is taking place, and many factories have 
established health and safety committees or worker committees to dis-
cuss workers' problems. This is an example of introducing "participation" 
where no "voice" existed before. Similarly, the ILO has a Factory Improve-
ment Programme that consists of training factory managers in the apparel 
industry to follow good work practices. This approach is based on the idea 
that managers can be persuaded to establish good and participatory work 
practices if it is demonstrably in their interest to do so. The results of these 
training programmes are encouraging. 
Such alternatives are open to a number of criticisms. The most impor-
tant one is that workers often do not participate in drawing up the codes of 
conduct that apply to them. Second, the evidence that they really provide 
voice is not very compelling. It is still too early to draw the conclusion that 
workers in these factories have adequate voice. However, they certainly 
have more say than they did in the past. 
Another relevant issue is whether providing voice at the workplace 
leads to some degree of voice at the policy level. Put differently, do collec-
tive bargaining rights necessarily lead to tripartite rights and practice? We 
do not have clear answers to this question. Many countries have little or no 
tripartite consultation over social policy issues, but considerable collective 
bargaining. On the other hand, for example, the international agreement 
on working conditions in the toy manufacturing industry fundamentally 
concerns workplace issues, i.e. health and safety in toy factories, but it has 
had wider effects on safety and health policy in some developing countries. 
The alternatives briefly mentioned above tend to increase workers' voice 
at the workplace, and in some cases in a wider context, without traditional 
notions of representation. 
Yet these avenues do not solve the problem of social dialogue for those 
who are not in an employment relationship. Arguably, there is no "employment 
relationship" in many parts of the informal sector, the largest sector in the 
world economy. Many in the informal sector are actually self-employed, 
and often engaged in contractual relationships with other people or insti-
tutions. Without representation, and without an employment relationship, 
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how can we provide social dialogue to the informal sector? This is the 
critical problem that definitions of voice do NOT address. 
Thus, when we consider how to improve social dialogue in the world 
(note that this is a more critical need in developing nations) there are 
three problems. First is the question whether many developing nations 
today have the institutional framework that gave rise to unions, collective 
bargaining and tripartite negotiations. Second is whether there is enough 
trade union representation for workers, given the low levels of union den-
sity in most third world nations. Third, the size of the informal sector 
shows that there is very little of the "employment relationship" which is so 
necessary to the ILO's definition of social dialogue. These problems may 
not be easily surmountable. 
What is the implication of the above discussion for developing meas-
ures of social dialogue? The paper takes a three-pronged approach. First, 
measures of social dialogue are developed in ways that are consistent 
with the ILO definition, i.e., assuming an employment relationship and 
requiring representation by unions and employer federations, incorporating 
both bipartite collective bargaining and tripartite negotiations. Although 
this does not address the various limitations noted above, especially in 
relation to third world nations, it still is a relevant approach, given (a) the 
current nature, composition, and focus of the ILO; (b) the relatively large 
percentage of countries where representation and the employment rela-
tionship exist; and (c) as long as our model of economic development is 
geared towards increased formal sector industrial employment (which is 
the case today). Thus, assuming that development will take place, the tra-
ditional approach involving unions, employers' associations, and govern-
ments remains valid. Therefore, the bulk of the measures developed in this 
paper are based on the conventional approach. 
Second, the paper includes measures of worker voice where there 
is no representation by unions. These include the plethora of alternative 
approaches that are emerging such as corporate, bilateral, and multilateral 
codes of conduct, certification programmes, NGO activities, worker devel-
opment and training programmes, and pressure from consumers. Given 
that these efforts are expanding, while trade unions are shrinking, it is 
important that the concept of social dialogue should take account of these 
alternative voice mechanisms. They are not perfect measures to be sure. For 
example, a key pillar of the ILO, the international trade union movement, 
is divided over how best to deal with these alternative approaches and is 
sometimes opposed to them on the grounds that they are poor substitutes 
for unions. They are right, in that they are poor substitutes for the degree of 
participation provided by trade unions, but in the absence of trade unions, 
they are a significant development: any measure of social dialogue then, 
must take into account these developments, however imperfect. 
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Third, the paper attempts to deal with the issue of social dialogue 
where there is no representation and no employment relationship, which 
characterizes a significant part of the third world today. As several authors 
have pointed out (e.g. Jose, 2002), the basic requirement here is a highly 
decentralized participative democratic regime. Unless there is grassroots 
democracy, there can never be social dialogue, especially where informal 
sectors are large and without the institutional conditions that favour the 
development of workplace, or tripartite institutions. As is patently obvious, 
there has to be a long-term revision of the ILO's definitions and objectives 
to be consistent with this approach. In sum, despite the various problems 
noted, the bulk of the measures developed in this paper are consistent with 
the ILO's current definitions of social dialogue. 
2. Prior approaches to measuring social dialogue 
This review of previous efforts to measure social dialogue provides 
more detail on each of the measures used in the table which appears in 
Annex I. 
The review highlights the major types of measure and examines the 
implications of each category for the future development of indicators. 
It also illustrates the point that no measure is perfect - they all have sig-
nificant advantages and disadvantages. Those interested in a more com-
plete discussion should refer to Lance Compa's paper (2002). The present 
review concerns social dialogue at national level. For measures at the indi-
vidual firm level, the reader might consult the reports of companies under 
the Global Reporting Initiative of the United Nations. 
In general, the various measures listed in the table can be broken 
down into five major categories: (a) common and universal measures; 
(b) particular measures of institutions, processes, and outcomes; (c) meas-
ures focusing on rights and violations thereof; (d) measures focusing on 
implementation; and (e) descriptive reports from various institutions. 
Common and universal measures 
These measures have been commonly used by the ILO and inde-
pendent writers for decades, they are generally easy to collect, they are 
quantitative or can be used in quantitative comparisons, and they are avail-
able for most member countries of the ILO. 
The first and most commonly used measure is union density, i.e., 
the number of union members expressed either as a percentage of the 
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non-agricultural workforce or as a percentage of wage and salary workers. 
Union density has sometimes been used as a measure of union strength. 
This measure has been seen as an important indicator of the potential for 
social dialogue, the argument being that higher union density is associ-
ated with more social dialogue at tripartite or bipartite level. Union density 
data exist for most countries, and experience in the European countries 
has invariably shown a positive correlation between union density and 
almost any other measure of tripartism or bipartite industrial relations. 
Nonetheless, the measure has also had its problems. First, not all coun-
tries outside Europe evidence the positive correlation noted above. Second, 
union density as a proxy for union strength and as a basis for dialogue is 
questionable in countries where unions are not independent and are sub-
ject to authoritarian control. Third, there have been several problems with 
the quality of data, both in terms of the data collection methodology and 
in the calculation of density. For a detailed review of the problems with 
using union density as a proxy for social dialogue and/or union strength 
and influence see Kuruvilla et al. (2002), and Compa (2002). An impor-
tant question is whether union density as a percentage of the agricultural 
workforce (a measure commonly used in North America) is appropriate, 
since agricultural workers in many countries do have unionization rights, 
and are, in fact, unionized. In this context, the percentage of union mem-
bers amongst wage and salary earners (the measure used by the OECD) 
might be more appropriate. 
A second indicator — collective bargaining coverage — has also gained 
popularity over time. Collective bargaining coverage was seen as a measure 
of bipartite industrial relations in countries where bargaining was invari-
ably conducted at the industrial or workplace levels; and it was considered 
to be a measure of tripartite industrial relations in countries where bar-
gaining was conducted at national level. Collective bargaining coverage 
was a tangible measure of the real degree of social dialogue (or participa-
tion) since it provided a quantifiable indicator of the number of workers 
who are actually covered by collective bargaining agreements i.e., in some 
sense a real measure of the effectiveness of collective bargaining. This 
measure is not as widely available as union density, and in some countries, 
the information is very difficult to collect. For example, many countries 
require that all collective bargaining agreements be registered yet there is 
no effort to consolidate the total number of agreements — thus, the data are 
available, but not collected and collated in usable form. In addition, there 
is a danger in assuming that collective bargaining coverage adequately rep-
resents the right to bargain, since in many countries collective bargaining 
agreements at the apex level are extended to cover workers in the entire 
industry, whether unionized or not. Kuruvilla et al. (2002) have combined 
indicators of collective bargaining coverage with levels of bargaining to 
arrive at a measure of union i: 
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arrive at a measure of union influence and effectiveness of representation, 
but this approach has not yet taken root. 
A third indicator that has been commonly used is whether countries 
have ratified the ILO Conventions relating to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining. The assumption here is that ratification denotes a 
country's basic commitment to social dialogue and can serve as a basis 
for the ILO to persuade members to increase social dialogue or at least 
to avoid repressing social dialogue possibilities. These data are easily col-
lected and are already in the ILO databases e.g. the reports of the Com-
mittee on Freedom of Association. Several studies have used these data 
to examine growth (Rama, 1995), export performance (Mah, 1997) and 
trade performance (Rodrik, 1996). Chau and Kanbur (2001) even find that 
standards are higher in countries which ratify Conventions than in coun-
tries that do not. The disadvantage of the measure is that not all countries 
have ratified the relevant Conventions (the United States for example), 
and even amongst those which have, there are many violations. Despite 
the problems, this indicator has tactical value, because such data make it 
possible for the ILO to use its powers of persuasion to convince countries 
to implement the Conventions in practice. For a detailed treatment of this 
measure, see Hepple (2003). 
A fourth measure, less commonly used than the others but still rela-
tively easy to collect, concerns the existence of national tripartite structures 
or institutions. The data are easy to collect using national legislation, but 
the existence of tripartite structures and institutions does not always guar-
antee that tripartite social dialogue actually takes place, nor does it tell us 
much about the quality of that dialogue. 
Particular measures of institutions, processes and outcomes 
These measures are highly variable. They reflect the approach of indi-
vidual researchers, data are often not readily available, and the measures are 
usually based on interpretation and judgement by academic researchers. 
The nature, processes, institutions, and outcomes of tripartism are 
the focus of this set of measures: for a detailed review see Kenworthy and 
Kittel (2002). One group of measures reflects the degree to which unions 
(or employer associations) are concentrated or centralized, which is argu-
ably a precondition for successful tripartism. A second group reflects the 
process of tripartism, for example, the levels at which bargaining takes 
place, the degree of corporatism in national decision making, the degree 
of policy concertation, or the level of involvement by different actors in 
the wage setting process (see Annex I for examples of these measures). A 
third group of measures reflects employer or union activity, such as the 
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degree of wage coordination, and the locus of authority in bargaining. In 
general, these three groups of measures focus on different aspects of the 
interaction between the tripartite, and in some cases, bipartite actors. A 
fourth group focuses on the outcomes of tripartite processes. The most 
common outcomes that have been studied are strikes and lockouts (this 
measure gives rise to several interpretation issues), wages (e.g. wage drift 
as a measure of tripartite bargaining or wage centralization), or the rela-
tionship between wage centralization (an outcome measure) and macro-
economic performance. Many variants of these measures can be found in 
the literature on corporatism which has been very popular in the realm of 
political science. 
Despite the variation in focus, these measures share some character-
istics. First, they have the advantage of being integrated in the national 
institutional framework — thus, they are largely "accurate" even if they are 
not quantitative in nature. A related point is that several of these measures 
require interpretation and judgement by researchers with deep institutional 
knowledge of the country's industrial relations systems. Much of the indus-
trial relations literature is case-study oriented, either national- or industry-
or workplace-level case studies. These qualitative measures certainly tell us 
more about how tripartism actually works than the traditional quantitative 
measures, although data on wages tell us a lot too. On the other hand, a 
significant disadvantage is that these measures tend to relate primarily to 
the Western European countries, largely due to the prevalence tripartism 
has enjoyed in many countries in this region. For example the link between 
wage centralization (a tripartism measure) and macroeconomic perform-
ance can be demonstrated only in countries where there is serious and 
active tripartism. Although these measures have been used in compara-
tive research, much of that research focuses on Europe. The measures do 
not transfer well to countries without strong tripartite arrangements or 
to those with decentralized bargaining regimes. However, this group of 
measures indicates that national experts must play a key role in depicting 
the practice of social dialogue. 
Measures focusing on rights 
A third set of measures focuses on the rights underpinning social 
dialogue. These measures go beyond ratification of ILO Conventions, as 
they indicate whether the rights to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining actually exist in member States. While the ILO has focused 
on this issue for decades, working quietly with each member State, these 
measures are slowly becoming more popular with recent debates about 
trade and labour standards and various monitoring efforts. At least one 
organization, Verite,2 assign 
to the rights (laws) underpir 
have the right to freely elect 
adequately protected from c 
ment control? Is there legal 
(2002) notes "Threshold eva 
determine whether the right 
of association to workers. H< 
He cites the example of the I 
against workers for union ac 
of the labour force from thi 
of analysis, the use of laws : 
careful analysis and expert k 
Another method of a] 
examination of violations. T 
and assigning numerical val 
freedom of association. This 
drawn from a multiplicity of; 
US State Department Section 
mittee of Experts on the Ap 
tions-CEARC) and Commit* 
are discussed in greater deta 
with this approach is that th 
input data. These suffer fror 
they are not comprehensive re 
country. The OECD classifie 
point "favourable to critical" : 
Similarly, another appro; 
codes and assigns numerical \ 
tions of freedom of associatioi 
zation rates, Freedom House i 
weighted and unweighted ind 
2
 Established in 1995, Verite is a n i 
zation (an NGO). Verite's mission i$ to ei 
working conditions. Verite accomplishes its 
with local humanitarian and advocacy organ 
tions. Where Verite auditors identify exploj 
place, Verite develops concrete steps to cars 
and workers, education programmes and $ 
over 700 factory evaluations in 61 countries 
in five countries with backgrounds in otga 
International. Recently, Verite completed its 
ment System). The report ranked countries c 
The website is www.verite.org 
186 J 
5 of authority in bargaining. In 
cus on different aspects of the 
some cases, bipartite actors. A 
tripartite processes. The most 
I are strikes and lockouts (this 
t issues), wages (e.g. wage drift 
ige centralization), or the rela-
outc'ome measure) and macro-
hese measures can be found in 
zn very popular in the realm of 
neasures share some character-
eing integrated in the national 
gely "accurate" even if they are 
s that several of these measures 
earchers with deep institutional 
)ns systems. Much of the indus-
ed, either national- or industry-
itative measures certainly tell us 
iian the traditional quantitative 
i lot too. On the other hand, a 
ures tend to relate primarily to 
ue to the prevalence tripartism 
1. For example the link between 
and macroeconomic perform-
:ies where there is serious and 
ts have been used in compara-
:s on Europe. The measures do 
ong tripartite arrangements or 
gimes. However, this group of 
lust play a key role in depicting 
Chapter V. Social dialogue for decent work 
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ular with recent debates about 
lonitoring efforts. At least one 
organization, Verite,2 assigns points on a number of measures pertaining 
to the rights (laws) underpinning social dialogue. For example, do workers 
have the right to freely elect their own representatives? Are union activists 
adequately protected from discrimination? Are unions free from govern-
ment control? Is there legal protection for the right to strike? As Compa 
(2002) notes "Threshold evaluations can examine laws with relative ease to 
determine whether the right legal framework is in place to afford freedom 
of association to workers. However, most countries' laws are not clear cut". 
He cites the example of the United States, where law forbids discrimination 
against workers for union activities, but goes on to exclude large swathes 
of the labour force from this protection. Thus, beyond a superficial level 
of analysis, the use of laws as indicators of social dialogue requires very 
careful analysis and expert knowledge of national labour law. 
Another method of approaching the rights question lies in the 
examination of violations. The OECD follows such an approach, coding 
and assigning numerical values to countries regarding compliance with 
freedom of association. This is based on qualitative and descriptive data 
drawn from a multiplicity of sources, including the ICFTU annual survey, 
US State Department Section 6 reports and ILO committee reports (Com-
mittee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommenda-
tions-CEARC) and Committee on Freedom of Association-COFA. These 
are discussed in greater detail in the fifth category below. The problem 
with this approach is that the numerical scores are only as good as the 
input data. These suffer from several problems, especially the fact that 
they are not comprehensive reviews of freedom of association in any given 
country. The OECD classifies countries into four categories, on a four-
point "favourable to critical" scale. 
Similarly, another approach has been taken by Kucera (2001), who 
codes and assigns numerical values to instances and seriousness of viola-
tions of freedom of association using seven different data sources (unioni-
zation rates, Freedom House indices, findings of violations in EPZs, and 
weighted and unweighted indices based on textual analysis of ICFTU's 
2
 Established in 1995, Verite is an independent, non-profit social auditing and research organi-
zation (an NGO). Verite's mission is to ensure that people worldwide work under safe, fair and legal 
working conditions. Verite accomplishes its mission through monitoring independent factories, linking 
with local humanitarian and advocacy organizations to interview workers and report on workplace condi-
tions. Where Verite auditors identify exploitation of workers or health and safety violations in the work-
place, Verite develops concrete steps to correct them through a combination of training for management 
and workers, education programmes and remediation programmes. Since 1995, they have completed 
over 700 factory evaluations in 61 countries. Their management team is comprised of individuals based 
in five countries with backgrounds in organizations such as Oxfam, Save the Children and Amnesty 
International. Recently, Verite completed its report to CALPERS (California Public Employees Retire-
ment System). The report ranked countries on 44 separate indicators connected with labour conditions. 
The website is www.verite.org 
187 
Decent work: Objectives and strategies 
annual surveys, US state department Section 6 reports and CEARC and 
COFA reports. This research develops 37 detailed criteria on freedom of 
association, yet the data gaps for any country are considerable as Compa 
(2002) points out. 
The focus on rights is clearly important because they are the foun-
dation on which the concept of social dialogue stands. There are some 
major implications of using this set of measures however. First, the col-
lection of such information requires a good knowledge of national labour 
law systems; there are differences across nations in terms of labour law, 
but also considerable variation within nations on how the law is estab-
lished and administered, which means that a knowledge of the admin-
istrative rules surrounding these rights is critical. Second, judgement is 
required, especially in the interpretation of legal positions and opinions. 
Third, interpretation and judgement are important in examining viola-
tions and using violations as a basis to score countries. For example, not 
all violations of the law are reported or documented, the nature of the 
violations differs within and across systems, and violations may only 
take place within one or two sectors within a country, (thus it would be 
wrong to "tar" the entire country with a low score on rights because of 
these limited violations). Alternatively, it may be that a high incidence 
of complaints pertaining to violations indicates the vibrancy and robust-
ness of the rights regime in that country. Hence, judgement is important 
in deciding whether the number of complaints is healthy or unhealthy. 
Fourth, the availability of data regarding labour law systems is not uni-
form — we know a lot about some countries' systems but less about 
others. Finally, many of the qualitative databases that underlie quantita-
tive measures and scores are complaint-driven, so they do not constitute 
a comprehensive survey in each country. 
Measures focusing on implementation 
Our fourth category of measures reflects the way in which labour laws 
are actually implemented in different countries. This is similar to exam-
ining how social dialogue works, but the focus is on whether the rights are 
respected. Two groups of measures are involved. The first includes assess-
ments by researchers or other experts on how things work - for example 
are there non-formal restrictions on the right to organize? Or is collective 
bargaining allowed without government interference? Do works councils 
or factory committees actually work? Some types of industrial relations 
outcomes may be useful here, such as the number of collective bargaining 
agreements, or strikes. The second group of measures relates to the insti-
tutional capacity of governments to enforce laws, and generally takes the 
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The disciplines of industrial relations and industrial sociology have a 
long tradition of examining practical implementation issues and outcomes, 
and there is a considerable body of published research. On the negative 
side, this research is diverse, since it focuses on different levels of IR insti-
tutions within countries; there is little uniformity in approach (except in 
regard to some outcomes); and there is variation in the countries which 
have been studied. Very little is known about labour institutions in at least 
a third of the ILO member States, partly because there is no academic 
tradition of studying these subjects. 
Here too, national expertise and informed judgement is critical to 
assessing the way in which IR systems work in practice, and to evaluating 
the degree to which governments are capable of implementing labour law. 
There is also the question of dealing with different expert interpretations 
of cases and events, and of identifying national experts. A major criticism 
of Verite's approach has been a lack of expertise in national industrial rela-
tions systems. 
Descriptive reports 
These fall into two categories, comprehensive and occasional. Compa 
(2002) has examined these in great detail. The best examples of compre-
hensive reports are those published by the US State Department (Section 6 
reports) that examine all labour rights, not just freedom of association; 
ICFTU's annual survey of violations of labour rights; and the ILO's 
CEARC and COFA reports. The State Department approach is to pro-
vide a yearly account of human rights in each country, based on a variety 
of sources, including document analysis, interviews with local experts and 
site visits by the labour attache. Many of the questions require interpreta-
tion and judgement, and the responses are not easily quantifiable. ICFTU's 
report provides an overview of labour law and practice and then describes 
specific violations during the year reported; their primary sources of infor-
mation are national labour movements. The third important group are the 
ILO's CEARC and COFA reports. These describe the situation in coun-
tries under scrutiny with respect to ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. The 
COFA reports are complaint driven. 
The advantage of these studies is that they are prepared at regular 
intervals (except COFA). The disadvantage is that in some cases they do 
not make an in-depth analysis of social dialogue, and where they are com-
plaint driven, they are not necessarily comprehensive. This tends to skew 
country assessments towards those whose trade unions avail themselves of 
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the COFA complaint procedure. But they do provide a "rich mosaic" of 
information (Compa, 2002) and should be part of any assessment of the 
right to social dialogue. 
The second category, occasional descriptive reports, covers a large 
variety of documents that are not annual or comprehensive. These include 
government agency reports (USILAB, USTR Trade Policy Committee, 
OPIC, NAALC, Congressional Research Service), International Agency 
Reports (e.g. UNHCR, GRI, and World Bank occasional reports) union 
reports (e.g. AFL-CIO) and private agencies and NGOs (AFL-CIO, 
Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Lawyers Committee on Human 
rights, International Labor Rights Fund, Amnesty International, Solidar, 
Asia Monitor Resource Center, Code of Conduct Reports, FLA). 
The comprehensive and annual reports are more useful than the occa-
sional reports since they provide consistent information regularly. They 
can be integrated in the present effort to develop indicators, and they are a 
useful source for national experts as well. The occasional reports also serve 
as a basis for further detailed and regular information-gathering efforts. 
Summary 
A wide variety of measures and indicators have been used to assess 
and demonstrate the social dialogue concept. There are quantitative and 
qualitative measures and a host of descriptive reports. In general, the 
measures exhibit tensions between quantitative approaches and subjec-
tive interpretations, breadth and depth of coverage of issues, complaint 
driven and comprehensive approaches, and static and dynamic indicators. 
The measures are also "skewed" geographically, towards countries where 
unions are strong and free, and have tripartite systems, or where the study 
of industrial relations is well developed. Descriptive reporting seems to 
dominate over comparative scoring schemes. All these measures have sig-
nificant disadvantages, and many "quantitative indicators" such as union 
density, collective bargaining coverage and strikes are open to different 
interpretations. The next section examines the implications of these past 
approaches for the further development of indicators, and for data collec-
tion and use. 
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3. Implications for indicator development, 
data collection and use 
The first principle is that any new effort must be connected with the 
old, to preserve some degree of continuity. Thus, despite their disadvan-
tages, measures that have been used frequently in the past, such as union 
density, will continue to play a part, although the data may be used in 
new ways. This principle also means that greater weight will be accorded 
to traditional bipartite and tripartite institutions in the development of 
measures. 
A second principle is that it is essential to measure the rights under-
pinning social dialogue. Because these rights are varied and numerous, 
we must select some over others. But this also implies that national or 
regional experts who are very familiar with the labour law systems must 
be involved in assessing these rights. 
Third, it is clear that a focus on rights alone is necessary but not suf-
ficient. We must measure how rights are implemented and how they are 
exercised in practice. Here too, local knowledge of the institutions and how 
they work in each country is essential to drawing conclusions. 
Fourth, it is clear that subjective interpretation by national experts is 
key to assessing social dialogue. As the data in Annex I suggest, the work 
of experts has resulted in more in-depth reporting which is more useful 
in assessing how social dialogue works than the quantitative indicators of 
union density, bargaining coverage, or wage drift. Since industrial relations 
institutions, rules, and outcomes are socially embedded in their unique 
institutional contexts, progress on social dialogue must be evaluated by 
experts with a deep institutional knowledge of those countries. This prin-
ciple, however, has one major implication. It is likely that arguments and 
differences of opinion will arise because of the subjective interpretations 
of national experts. There are two ways in which this can be minimized. 
First, it is advisable that all national experts follow a basic framework of 
assessment that is flexible and sensitive to cross-national institutional dif-
ferences. The present paper will develop this framework and issue detailed 
guidelines for national experts. Second, it is important that assessments 
of social dialogue in each country be made public and available on the 
internet, so that dissenting voices and views can also be aired. In the long 
term, transparency is key to measuring progress on social dialogue. 
Fifth, it is clear that there must be a dynamic focus when developing 
social dialogue indicators. We must move beyond static indicators to pro-
vide a sense of where social dialogue is headed - at the minimum our 
measures must indicate trends or the direction of progress. 
Sixth, and consistent with the new interpretation of social dialogue 
..as a mechanism to increase workers' voice, it is necessary to develop 
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indicators of social dialogue in a non-union setting or in places where 
unions do not exist. 
A seventh principle pertains to the quality of information and the 
cost of data gathering. We know that easily available data (such as union 
density) tell us very little about social dialogue in practice. We also know 
that detailed descriptive studies tell us the most. Many information-rich 
approaches use multiple methods, including case studies, complaints, inter-
views, analysis of documents and so on. It seems likely that a qualitative 
research approach may yield the most useful information. Surveys are less 
useful because they are not always sensitive to how institutions work and 
the extent to which rules are followed. It is also likely that a qualitative 
approach using national experts will cost less than country surveys. 
Finally, the choice of indicators depends heavily on how the data are 
likely to be used. One type of usage (indeed, the majority of previous work) 
is to determine whether there is, in fact, violation of the freedom of asso-
ciation in member countries and the extent of violation. The CEARC and 
COFA reports of the ILO are good examples here. A second type of usage 
is embodied in the OECD approach, which is explicitly comparative and 
seeks to group countries according to the severity of violation. Similarly, 
organizations like Verite have focused on the development of comparative 
scoring and ranking systems, which are then used to drive investment deci-
sions. A third type of usage has been to link measures of social dialogue to 
broader constructs such as economic development and trade performance, 
and some of these studies have been comparative in nature. 
The key purpose of developing indicators of social dialogue is to help 
nations make progress on social dialogue and decent work. This is the 
ILO's interest as well. Thus the indicators should be used for longitudinal 
comparisons within nations, rather than cross-sectional comparisons between 
nations. The present paper therefore develops the concept of "national 
social dialogue data sheets" which make it possible to assess the nature of 
social dialogue at a glance, and to assess progress over time. The approach 
includes both scorable and non-scorable criteria to present a comprehen-
sive picture of social dialogue, and therefore yields enough information 
to make comparisons on some issues. However, the primary focus is on 
measuring national progress. 
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4. Indicators for the national social 
dialogue data sheet 
This section presents the indicators, provides a rationale for each one, 
and develops guidelines for reporting and assessment. The indicators are 
listed in Annex II. 
A. Basic control information 
The indicators in this group provide some basic information that is 
relevant for the operation of social dialogue. Such indicators have been 
widely used in the past; they link up with earlier approaches and facilitate 
longitudinal comparisons. 
Al. Union density and changes in density 
Rationale. This is a widely used measure that is available for most 
countries. It is not an indicator of social dialogue, although it has been 
used as such in past work. It is included as basic control data, although we 
do not make any interpretations from this measure. 
Guidelines for national experts. It is necessary to report three 
aspects of union density data. First is the denominator used (some countries 
calculate density as part of the wage and salaried workforce (e.g. OECD 
countries), while others calculate it as a percentage of the non-agricultural 
workforce (United States). Second, it is also necessary to report the data 
source. Many countries use unions as the primary source for union mem-
bership data, while others use national surveys. Third, it is important to 
indicate the trend in union density - perhaps over the last five years, or at 
least to report the percentage change, so as to provide a dynamic picture. 
A2. Whether countries have ratified ILO Conventions Nos. 87 
and 98, and the number of violations of these Conventions 
during the last five years. 
Rationale. Monitoring and reporting this information might induce 
more countries to ratify the Conventions. Although this does not guar-
antee social dialogue, ratifying countries can be persuaded to uphold these 
rights. It is also important to report trend data, since we are interested in 
progress. 
Guidelines for national experts. It is necessary to use multiple 
sources of information here. National statistics are the obvious first stop, 
though not all countries keep figures on violations of these two Conven-
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tions. The second stop must include CEARC data and COFA data from 
the ILO, which can be made available to national experts. Third, other 
sources of data can be consulted. The key issue here is for the national 
experts to report the data, but also to give an opinion on whether they 
think this is a partial or comprehensive picture of violations. A compre-
hensive picture is collected from a source where most if not all violations 
are reported. 
Example: For the United States, the data sheet might look like this. 
- Ratified ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98: No 
- Violations of ILO Conventions 2000: 14 2001: 12 2002: 10 (These fig-
ures are not real.) 
- Violations information based on data that is: Comprehensive 
I 
I 
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but are not allowed to bai 
B. Rights underlying 
If the basis for freedom 
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A3. Labour force statistics 
Rationale. To provide basic information about the labour force in 
absolute numbers and as a percentage of the population, as well as the 
size of the labour force in different sectors. The sector-wise distribution 
is important because some sectors tend to evidence more social dialogue 
than others (e.g. manufacturing over services). 
Guidelines for national experts. Sector-wise employment data are 
easily available from national or international statistics for most countries. It 
is necessary to report employment in each sector rather than the contribu-
tion of each sector to GDP. However, it is also necessary to provide some 
measure of unionization or collective bargaining by sector, if possible. 
A4. Who does the legislation on freedom of association and 
collective bargaining apply to? Which categories of people 
are excluded from this legislation? What percentage of 
the non-agricultural population has rights with regard to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining? 
Rationale. This is critical information. It is a dynamic measure, since 
it allows us to see whether countries progressively expand the propor-
tion of workers who have access to social dialogue. For example, in the 
Republic of Korea teachers have recently been given the right to form 
unions and bargain collectively. 
Guidelines for national experts. Calculations must be based on 
the laws in each country, and on labour force statistics. In many countries 
this information is not easily available, so researchers will have to make 
the calculations themselves. Experts must make clear the denominator 
that is being used. 
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Example: In the United States, roughly 27 per cent of the civilian labour 
force does not have the right to bargain collectively. A smaller percentage 
does not have the right to freedom of association (this is largely because a 
number of public sector employees have the right of freedom of association 
but are not allowed to bargain collectively). 
B. Rights underlying social dialogue 
If the basis for freedom of association and collective bargaining is not 
strong, then social dialogue (either tripartite or bipartite) will not function 
well. A large number of indicators are relevant here. 
Bl. Freedom of association 
The right of workers to form representative organizations of their 
own choosing is a primary determinant of social dialogue. This section 
focuses on how employer and union organizations are formed, whether 
they are free to operate without government supervision or interference, 
whether members of these organizations are protected against discrimina-
tion, and whether these rights can be taken away either temporarily or at 
government whim. 
B1A. Union and employer association formation 
Rationale. There is great variety in the laws and processes of union 
formation around the world. In some countries the process is simple and easy; 
in others it is long drawn out and difficult. This often has significant impli-
cations for the unions' ability to bargain collectively, as in the United States. 
In that country, 30 per cent of workers must indicate their preference for a 
union, in which case the NLRB conducts elections. Until the elections are 
over, both sides (union and employer advocates) try to persuade the workers 
to join or not to join. In addition, allegations of unfair labour practices must 
be investigated. It is possible for the employer to legally delay the process of 
union formation through tactical actions. In some countries, unions can only 
be formed if the government permits and the government has the absolute 
right to grant union registration or withhold it, as is the case in Malaysia. 
There is generally less variation in the formation of employers' asso-
ciations and the process is quite simple. Moreover, often there is no leg-
islation limiting the formation of employer associations. Hence, we focus 
only on the formation of unions. 
Guidelines for national experts. A categorization scheme is pro-
vided below to guide the judgement of national experts. 
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Category Description 
Category A: Simple process 
Category B: Lengthy process 
that is open to influence (de 
jure) by employers 
Category C: Difficult process 
where employers (de facto) 
have great influence over 
union formation 
Category D: Process where 
prior government permission 
is required de jure 
Where the process of union formation is simple and direct; 
where there is no supervision by government bodies and 
no need to conduct elections; where there is no scope for 
employer opposition. 
Where the laws prescribe a lengthy and time-consuming 
process; where employers can influence the outcome of elec-
tions through campaigns or can influence the speed at which 
a union can form through tactical but legal actions. 
Where employers can influence the outcome of a union 
election though legal and illegal actions; where these type 
of action are widely used (substantiated with figures); where 
the punishment for violations of the law is not a sufficient 
deterrent. 
Where unions must seek government permission to form: 
where governments have a history of denying permission 
(figures needed here). 
Example: The United States would fall into category C on this scale (since 
the un ion formation process is quite complex and can be challenged on 
various occasions by the employer) while Malaysia (where the Registrar of 
Trade Unions has near absolute power to accord or withhold registration) 
will fall into category D . 
BIB. Independence of unions and employer associations 
Rationale. Social dialogue depends heavily on unions and employer 
associations being independent of government control. There is variation 
here as well. In most countries unions at the local or national level are 
independent but in some countries they are heavily controlled by govern-
ment, which limits their ability to voice the concerns of workers effec-
tively. Assessing the degree of government control is not easy. Verite, for 
example, has created a four point scale in which a score of 3 means that 
multiple unions can organize without government interference, 2 indicates 
some interference, 1 means that unions are closely affiliated with the gov-
ernment and 0 means that they are not independent. The literature on 
corporatism is particularly relevant here since different models of corpo-
ratism tend to evidence different levels of government control over unions, 
as noted by Kenworthy and Kittel (2002). The literature on corporatism 
is used as a basis for developing categories here; a three point scale is 
recommended. 
Guidelines for national experts. A categorization scheme is pro-
vided below. 
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Category A: Independent Where it is clear from historical studies, case studies, and the 
national expert's own research, that unions are independent 
of government control, where the government or ruling party 
is not a significant source of union finances, and where the 
government or ruling party does not control the union's stra-
tegic goal articulation. 
Where previous studies, case studies, or the national expert's 
research shows that there is notional independence but that 
there is still some degree of government influence over national 
or local union decisions (examples should be provided). Or 
when one federation is controlled by the government while 
other federations are free of government control. 
Category C: Not independent Where it is clear that the unions in general are controlled by 
government, or that only one federation friendly to the gov-
ernment is permitted to exist. 
Category B: Unclear 
Example: The United States would be classified in category A; Singapore 
would be in category B (there is much controversial research that links the 
People's Action Party and the Singapore National Trade Union Congress, 
making this arguable); the Republic of Korea before 1997 would be a good 
example of category C. 
B1C. Protection from discrimination 
against union members or activists 
Rationale. The key issue here is whether nations provide protec-
tion from employer or government retaliation against workers who join 
unions or who are union activists. Without such protection, social dialogue 
cannot move forward. Here too there is variation, although the extremes 
are easy to measure. There are many Western European nations with no 
explicit legal protection but with no violations because of the country's 
institutional history and structure. The long list of unfair labour practices 
outlined in US legislation might merit placement in category A: but the 
general ineffectiveness of the law as a deterrent to such behaviour and the 
continuing evidence of violations would give at best, a place in category 
B. Malaysia gives some protection against discrimination but a variety of 
other actions are de facto permissible under the law (e.g. the practice of 
closing a factory because of union activity and then reopening it with 
non-union employees - indirectly discriminating against union members) 
would merit, at best, a place in category C. Countries where no protection 
exists would be placed in category D. 
Guidelines for national experts. The following categorization will 
help national experts to place countries. 
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Category A: Strong protection 
with full recourse or institu-
tional conditions which do 
not permit such violations. 
Category B: Partial protection 
with full recourse 
Category C: Partial protection 
with partial and ineffective 
recourse 
Category D: No protection 
Where a broad set of anti-union activities are illegal; where 
the law provides procedural recourse that is generally consid-
ered effective (previous research/case studies) or where the 
number of violations has steadily declined in the past five 
years (NE to provide data), or where such violations are non-
existent due to wider institutional forces in the country. 
Where a much narrower set of practices are illegal; where 
there is a system of resolution provided by law that is gener-
ally considered effective (research/case studies), and where 
the data show a declining trend. 
Where the law does not clearly prohibit anti-union practices; 
or where there is no effective system to resolve alleged viola-
tions, and where the data show persistent violations (report 
data). 
B2. Bipartite free collective bargaining 
Union formation is necessary for social dialogue but it is not suffi-
cient. For social dialogue to occur the parties, once formed, must be able 
to bargain freely. Category B2 indices concern the ability to bargain. Note 
that in countries which lack an environment congenial to the development 
of unions and collective bargaining, alternative representative structures 
might accomplish the same objectives. We deal with these later. 
B2A. Union recognition and obligation to bargain 
Rationale. Once unions have formed, bargaining cannot necessarily 
start automatically. In some countries there is a distinction between union 
formation and recognition of the union as the bargaining agent, an inter-
mediary step before the employer is obliged to bargain. In other countries 
recognition as the bargaining agent takes place at the formation stage. 
Second, even after formation and recognition, there is variation in the 
duties imposed on the employer. Some countries impose an obligation 
to bargain. Others impose the obligation, but the process is riddled with 
loopholes which can delay the start of bargaining. Several countries do 
not impose an obligation to bargain on the employer. Social dialogue on 
a bilateral basis cannot take place if there is no obligation to bargain or 
if bargaining can be delayed. For instance, in the United States, research 
shows that in roughly 25 per cent of the cases where unions win the rep-
resentation election, there are delays in bargaining. 
Guidelines for national experts. The following schema may be 
used by national experts in assessing their countries on this dimension. 
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Category A: Clear rules 
on recognition and obligation 
to bargain 
Category B: Problems in 
recognition or problems with 
the obligation to bargain 
Category C: No recognition 
or no obligation to bargain 
Where there are clear rules regarding union recognition, and 
where the law imposes a clear duty on the employer to bar-
gain; where data show no violation of the obligation to bar-
gain; where data show no delays in union recognition. 
Where the rules regarding bargaining and recognition are 
clear but where practice shows delays in one or both. 
Where there are no rules regarding recognition (in cases 
where recognition is required) with consequent delays in the 
start of bargaining, and/or where there is no obligation on 
the part of the employer to bargain. 
B2B. Scope and subject matter of bargaining 
Rationale. The obligation to bargain does not in itself guarantee 
that successful social dialogue will take place. Countries differ on what 
they will allow the parties to bargain about. At one end of the continuum 
are countries (e.g. Sweden) in which co-determination legislation man-
dates that any subject of interest to either union or management is subject 
to bargaining. In the middle of the continuum are countries that make 
a distinction with regard to bargaining subjects. The United States, for 
example, uses the "mandatory" versus "permissive" distinction. Manda-
tory subjects such as hours, wages, and working conditions are normal sub-
jects of bargaining, while permissive subjects such as management rights 
or union security issues will be bargained only if both parties agree that 
they are negotiable. This approach also gives rise to continual debates on 
what is a mandatory subject and what is permissive. At the other end of 
the continuum are countries which prohibit bargaining on certain issues. 
Singapore and Malaysia do not permit bargaining on transfers, promo-
tions, job assignments, retrenchment and lay-offs. Taiwan (China), does 
not permit bargaining on the introduction of new technology. Thus, the 
scope of bargaining directly affects the extent of social dialogue. 
Guidelines for national experts. The following table is based on 
the variations identified in the literature. 
Category A: Broad scope 
Category B: Intermediate 
scope 
Category C: Narrow 
or restricted scope 
Where any item of interest to either party is bargainable. 
Where the rules suggest that some subjects may be bargained 
only if both parties agree that they are negotiable. 
Where the subjects of bargaining are restricted by 
legislation. 
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B2C. Right to strike, restrictions on the right to strike, 
and weakening of the right 
Rationale. Free collective bargaining requires the right to lockout 
(for employers) or strike (by unions). Many countries have procedures that 
restrict the right to strike in national emergencies, but we will not con-
sider that here. Similarly, strikes are often banned in essential services in 
most nations, and that is also excluded from the present discussion. We 
will simply note that some countries choose to take such a broad view of 
"essential" that it could be a significant threat to the right to strike. 
At one end of the continuum are countries that freely permit the right 
to strike for non-essential service workers, or at least the private sector. 
The Western European countries are good examples. Then there are 
countries that permit workers to strike if they are directly involved in an 
industrial dispute, but which do not permit sympathy strikes. The United 
States and the United Kingdom are good examples here. Then there are 
countries that permit the right to strike, but significantly weaken the right 
in certain ways. The United States is a good example here since it allows 
employers to permanently replace striking workers where the dispute does 
not involve unfair labour practices - wage disputes fall into this group. 
Other countries permit the right to strike, but then de facto take away 
that right through a plethora of administrative rules and restrictions. In 
India and Singapore, for example, dispute resolution rules require 14 days 
notice of strike. If either party calls for mediation, then the strike must be 
withheld and the parties must enter the mediation process. If mediation 
is not successful, the government may refer the dispute to binding arbitra-
tion, or to an industrial court or tribunal (the two countries differ on this 
approach). Theoretically then, strikes will not take place if this procedure 
is followed. Singapore has not reported a strike in the last 12 years, while 
India reports strikes on a daily basis (which shows that the procedure 
does not work well in India). Finally, some countries, such as China, still 
do not permit the right to strike. Apart from the legal provisions in force, 
it is necessary to take account of subtle variations in rules that cannot be 
captured by a simple scoring mechanism, thus requiring national experts 
to exercise their judgement. One rule that is prone to much variation is the 
definition of legal and illegal strikes under national law. 
Guidelines for national experts. The following guidelines do not 
place great emphasis on data regarding strikes, since the number of strikes 
and lockouts is affected by issues other than rules, such as the economic 
cycle and shifts in bargaining power. We also know that the number of 
strikes has decreased steadily in most countries with the decline in trade 
union membership. 
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Category A: Unfettered right Where workers may strike even if they are not directly Jinked 
to strike to the dispute (e.g. sympathy strikes). 
Category B: Normal right When workers directly connected with the dispute are free 
to strike to strike. 
Category C: Weakening Where industrial relations rules permit the replacement of 
of the right to strike striking workers, thus weakening the ability of labour to exer-
cise the right to strike. 
Category D: Circumvention Where the right is curtailed by provisions that require the 
of the right to strike strike to be withheld, or the use of compulsory arbitration or 
adjudication for private sector workers. Each country is likely 
to have different rules that affect the right to strike. 
Category E: No right to strike When there is a ban on strikes. 
B2D. Parallel workplace representation 
Rationale. Social dialogue is improved if employees have avenues 
(besides unions) for participation at work. In the absence of unions, these 
avenues are particularly important. The best known example of parallel 
representation is the works council, which is common in most Western 
European countries. There is great variation in the scope and function of 
works councils or similar institutions across countries, however. In addi-
tion, there is a debate on whether works councils in fact substitute for 
unions, and this argument has been cited by many unions to oppose gov-
ernment plans to introduce works councils (the United States). On the 
other hand, European experience shows that unions can work well with 
works councils, often exercising significant control over them. It should 
be noted that works councils evolved long after unions were formed in 
most European nations. It is possible that they represent an evolution 
in traditional industrial relations concomitant with "new forms of work 
organization" which are accompanied by high flexible wages, wages tied 
to skill acquisition, high participation, and flexible deployment or "func-
tional flexibility". 
Guidelines for national experts. 
Category A Countries where the law prescribes the works council or committee and man-
dates regular meetings covering a wide range of issues. 
Category B Countries where the law prescribes some form of workplace level com-
mittee, even if the scope is restricted. Safety and health committees are good 
examples. 
Category C Countries with no provision for workplace representation. 
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B3. Tripartism 
This section focuses on a series of rights that underpin tripartism. 
B3A. Right to tripartite processes 
Rationale. Tripartism depends heavily on whether the law provides 
for it. Many countries explicitly provide for tripartism in their national 
legislation. It is also possible that there is no legal provision for tripartite 
relationships, but that they are practised (hence the differentiation between 
rights and practice). It is also possible that countries provide for tripartism 
in a limited form, i.e. for specific subjects. In addition, the enactment of 
legislation regarding tripartism is often the result of demands by strong 
unions. It is clear, however, that tripartism flourishes when it is backed by 
legislation, whatever the origin of the right to tripartite processes. 
Guidelines for national experts. Three categories are relevant here. 
Category A Where national legislation explicitly requires some form of tripartite 
consultation. 
Category B Where the law does not specify any requirement or form of tripartite practice 
and does not prohibit it in any form. 
Category C Where tripartite processes are explicitly prohibited. 
B3B. Limitations on tripartite rights-. Affiliation 
Rationale. Even if countries explicitly require or do not prohibit tri-
partism, there are several ways in which the ability of actors to effectively 
engage in tripartite activity is reduced or enhanced. One issue is whether 
unions or employer associations have the right to affiliate to federations or 
industry level bodies. There are two ways in which the right to free affili-
ation is limited. The first is a ban on affiliation. As an example, Malaysia 
permits enterprise level unions in its electronics industry but does not 
permit them to affiliate with industry level unions. In other cases, unions 
are only allowed to affiliate with a specific federation, which is often spon-
sored by the government, without the freedom to affiliate with alternative 
or competing federations. This is also a limitation of tripartite rights. 
Guidelines for national experts. There are two categories here. 
Category A relates to countries which do not prohibit affiliation to higher 
level organizations or federations. Category B countries explicitly prohibit 
such affiliation or require affiliation to a preferred federation. 
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B3C. Limitations on tripartite rights: Politics 
Rationale. Tripartite social dialogue is generally understood to mean 
that employer organizations and unions participate broadly in economic 
and political discourse. Yet many countries restrict the ability of unions 
and employer organizations to do so. One method is to limit their ability to 
affiliate with political parties. The second is to expressly forbid apex trade 
union or employer organizations from participating in politics. Malaysia is 
a good example of this, as the apex federations are registered as societies 
rather than unions. 
Guidelines for national experts. There are three categories here. 
Category A Countries where there are no restrictions on union or employer abilities to par-
ticipate in politics or affiliate with higher level organizations or federations. 
Category B Countries where there are restrictions on the ability of unions and employer 
organizations to affiliate with higher level bodies. 
Category C Countries where unions and employers are prohibited from political activities 
and debate. 
C. Social dialogue in practice 
This section focuses on indicators of both process and outcome, so 
that we can assess how social dialogue is working. 
CI. Bipartite process and outcome 
CIA. Collective bargaining coverage 
Rationale. A measure of coverage is essential since it indicates how 
many employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements. The 
number of union members or union density may not be closely related to 
collective bargaining coverage for a variety of reasons. In many developing 
countries (e.g. Philippines), the number of union members (according to 
union records) is much higher than the number of employees covered by 
collective bargaining agreements. This is due to overstatement of union 
members on the one hand, and the presence of unions of unemployed per-
sons, on the other. In France, for example, collective bargaining coverage 
is very high (almost 80 per cent), although union density figures are very 
low. This is because agreements reached by some unions and employers are 
extended to the rest of the industry. A second problem with collective bar-
gaining coverage is that while some countries have the data, others do not. 
Guidelines for national experts. For this indicator to be useful, 
the national expert should report the data over time (e.g. for the last five 
years), identify how the data were collected, and explain any variance 
between this measure and union density. 
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C1B. Number of collective agreements 
Rationale. The number of collective bargaining agreements tells us 
whether bipartite social dialogue is increasing or decreasing. It is a direct 
measure of the growth of collective bargaining. Although the number of 
agreements might be related to coverage, note that coverage is partly due to 
other institutional forces, as in France. It is also possible that coverage may 
be high even with a low number of agreements, if the size of the workforce 
covered by each agreement is large. Hence, both measures are necessary. 
Note that the number of agreements in any given year will vary with the 
length of the agreements, which typically ranges between one and five years. 
Guidelines for national experts. Report the number of collective 
bargaining agreements for each of the last five years, at least. 
C1C. Parallel workplace arrangements 
Rationale. Since we have a measure of rights regarding parallel 
workplace arrangements it is also necessary to see how those rights trans-
late into practice. The international variation here is great, as is the avail-
ability of good data. Some countries (e.g. Japan) report the number of 
joint labour/management councils in firms, while others do not. In most 
Western European countries works councils are mandatory, yet there is 
no systematic information on what they do in practice. These institutions 
also differ substantially in terms of scope. Works councils in Europe are 
typically involved in all aspects of the employment relationship except for 
wages. There is some evidence in Germany for example, that over time the 
works councils have increased the scope of their decision making activi-
ties. In contrast there are many countries where the scope is limited. In the 
Philippines, for example, labour/management councils typically discuss 
only safety health, and welfare issues. Thus, the national experts must draw 
on previous research and data to make an assessment. 
Guidelines for national experts. 
Category A Where parallel workplace arrangements generally exist in most firms, and where 
these institutions take substantial decisions regarding day-to-day workplace issues i.e. 
where the scope is broad. Where possible, data on distribution should be provided. 
Category B Where only a minority of firms have parallel representation arrangements and 
where they take substantial decisions, i.e. where the scope is broad. Where pos-
sible, data on the distribution of such institutions should be provided. 
Category C Where parallel representation institutions commonly exist, but have limited 
scope (e.g. safety and health only, or welfare only or some other combination 
that suggests limited scope). 
Category D Where parallel representation with limited scope exists but only in a minority 
of firms. 
Category E Where parallel representation institutions do not exist, or they exist but are not 
routinely used. 
204 
rgaining agreements tells us 
or decreasing. It is a direct 
lg. Although the number of 
:hat coverage is partly due to 
o possible that coverage may 
;, if the size of the workforce 
oth-measures are necessary. 
;iven year will vary with the 
s between one and five years. 
>rt the number of collective 
e years, at least. 
af rights regarding parallel 
i see how those rights trans-
here is great, as is the avail-
pan) report the number of 
mile others do not. In most 
are mandatory, yet there is 
. practice. These institutions 
Drks councils in Europe are 
ment relationship except for 
: example, that over time the 
heir decision making activi-
e the scope is limited. In the 
it councils typically discuss 
: national experts must draw 
essment. 
rally exist in most firms, and where 
irding day-to-day workplace issues i.e. 
i on distribution should be provided. 
:1 representation arrangements and 
ere the scope is broad. Where pos-
tions should be provided. 
commonly exist, but have limited 
e only or some other combination 
scope exists but only in a minority 
) not exist, or they exist but are not 
& 
Chapter V. Social dialogue for decent work 
C1D. Number of strikes and lockouts 
Rationale. This is one measure of healthy social dialogue, as the right 
to strike and lockout is a key element in practice. The actual number of 
strikes and lockouts is open to different interpretations. For example, coun-
tries that recognize the right to strike but report no strikes either have very 
good labour-management relations or place administrative restrictions on 
the right to strike. A dramatic increase in the number of lockouts can sug-
gest a change in relative bargaining power between employers and unions. 
Strikes may occur for a number of reasons including political motivations. 
Guidelines for national experts. Report the number of strikes and 
lockouts over time. 
C1E. Data on grievances or industrial disputes 
Rationale. This is yet another (and more important) measure of the 
health of bipartite labour relations. Unions may not strike because of weak 
bargaining power, and employers may not lockout for the same reason. How-
ever, disputes between labour and management are best resolved through 
means other than the strike. For social dialogue to work well, it is essential 
that employees and employers use these alternative means to settle their dif-
ferences. In addition, in countries where the right to strike is administratively 
restricted (see Hebdon and Stern, 2003) the number of disputes and griev-
ances may be high, as employees seek alternative ways to settle their disputes. 
There is great variation in the availability of data. Most countries 
report the number of disputes or grievances that go to arbitration or other 
third-party resolution mechanisms. Some countries also report disputes 
by cause, which provides even more information regarding the health of 
social dialogue, since it tells us which aspects of freedom of association 
and collective bargaining are being violated. 
Guidelines for national experts. Report trend data on the number 
of disputes and if possible the number of disputes by cause for the last 
five years. 
C2. Tripartite process and outcome 
C2A. Tripartite processes 
Rationale. Even within Western Europe, where tripartism is most 
developed, there is wide variation in the way it works in practice. The 
literature on corporatism (which is heavily focused on Europe) is a good 
basis for developing and refining this measure, although the present paper 
relies on research in developing nations to create categories that take 
account of the variation across countries. This measure is also based on 
the judgement of the national expert, but backed up by research. (Annex I 
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lists the large number of measures used in previous research that focus 
on the outcomes of tripartism). 
Guidelines for national experts. 
Category A Where there is evidence of regular meetings and cooperation between the 
social partners, and there is clear and documented evidence of participation in 
key macroeconomic decisions. Data on the regularity of meetings is necessary 
but not sufficient here. It is important that the national expert provide concrete 
examples of national decisions. This could involve wages too. 
Category B Where there is no regular interaction between the social partners, but they 
come together when occasion demands; decisions regarding national economic 
and social issues emerge from tripartite discussion. 
Category C Where there are occasional meetings between the social partners, primarily 
for information and consultation; the social partners make recommendations, 
which may or may not be accepted by the government. 
Category D Where it is clear that social partners meet but not to discuss substantial issues 
(pseudo-tripartism). 
Category E No participation in any issue at the national level. 
C2B. Tripartite outcomes: Wages 
Rationale. It is useful to have an objective measure of outcomes 
as well as the subjective measure based on the judgement of the national 
expert. The simplest objective measure is wage drift. However, since this 
is only applicable where wages are the subject of centralized bargaining, 
this measure cannot be used in all countries. 
Guidelines for national experts. 
Category A Report data on wage drift for countries in which bargaining is highly central-
ized at tripartite or industry level. 
Category B Does not apply: do not report data in countries where bargaining is primarily 
decentralized. 
C2C. Tripartite outcomes: Income inequality 
Rationale. An important indicator of the success of tripartism in 
industrial relations is the extent of income inequality. While it is true that 
inequality is caused by a number of factors (such as skill differentiation), 
there is also very strong evidence that inequality increases when bargaining 
systems become decentralized (see Kuruvilla et al., 2002). Thus, high ine-
quality is likely to be associated with a decrease in tripartite activity or no 
tripartite activity at all. 
Guidelines for national experts. The World Bank reports income 
inequality data for most countries. It is necessary to report the gini-coef-
ficient over time, but also to report the source of the data, as multiple 
sources exist for several countries. 
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D. Alternative avenues for social dialogue: 
Codes of conduct, certification and reporting systems 
Dl. Descriptive measures of industry codes 
Rationale. Alternative approaches are particularly relevant for third 
world countries with fairly limited labour movements, and with national 
legislation which has not been effective in providing opportunities for social 
dialogue. Some corporate codes of conduct have developed in response to 
pressure from northern unions and NGOs precisely because legislation in 
some countries was not sufficiently protective of workers' rights. 
These emerging approaches require attention on the part of the 
national expert for two main reasons. First, they are often sector-specific 
or industry-specific and it is necessary to estimate how many workers are 
covered by these arrangements. Second, and most important, it is neces-
sary to know if local workers are involved in drawing up the codes of 
conduct that apply to them. Research shows that this is generally not the 
case, but we do know that international unions are sometimes involved in 
designing multilateral codes of conduct or industry-specific codes. The dif-
ferent mechanisms (codes, certification schemes, reporting arrangements), 
the variations in application (countries, industries, sectors), and the vari-
ations in effectiveness do not permit the creation of uniform or objective 
assessment criteria. The approach is therefore to leave this as a descriptive 
measure. National experts should consider various issues (see below) when 
they report and assess these developments. Since these alternatives are just 
emerging, it is possible that future research on effectiveness will make it 
possible to develop classifications and scorable criteria. 
Guidelines for national experts. National experts should report on 
each of the following issues. 
(a) Industry codes of conduct. Attention should be paid to the scope of the 
code (broad or narrow), the number of employees in the industry 
who are effectively covered by the code, and whether there are any 
research studies on the code's effectiveness in improving workers' 
participation in decision making. 
(b) Company codes. The national expert should determine whether a majority 
of companies in a particular industry (e.g. sports shoes or garments) 
are covered by corporate codes of conduct, whether monitoring is 
conducted by independent monitors; the number of workers in the 
industry who are covered by the codes should be noted. National 
experts should also report on the scope of the codes in terms of fur-
thering social dialogue. 
(c) Certification and reporting systems. National experts should report on the 
number of companies in the relevant industry that are part of general 
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certification and reporting schemes, and whether these are monitored 
by independent monitors. They should cite case study evidence where 
available. 
In general, the national experts should focus their assessments on 
the involvement of local workers in developing alternative practices, and 
the extent to which social dialogue opportunities for local workers have 
increased as a result of these practices. 
E. Implementation and government capacity 
National law has to be enforced in ways that make the practice of 
social dialogue possible. There are two main approaches to enforcement. 
The first is to impose high penalties for non-compliance. The second is 
to operate an inspection regime that is reliable and forces employers and 
unions to obey the law. 
El. Penalties for violating social dialogue laws 
Rationale. The enactment of laws pertaining to social dialogue is 
not sufficient to ensure that social dialogue takes place. It is possible for 
actors to break the law or ignore it on a routine basis. For example US 
employers continually violate the law that prohibits firing union organ-
izers. Research suggests that they do this because the penalties for viola-
tion are minor compared to the savings made by keeping a union from 
forming in their enterprise. 
Guidelines for national experts. This subject requires the national 
experts to exercise their own judgement, but the following categories are 
proposed as a guide. 
Category A Where in the opinion of the national expert, the penalties for violation are not 
a sufficient deterrent. National expert to provide trend data for past five years 
on violations. 
Category B Where in the opinion of the national expert the penalties for violation are a suf-
ficient deterrent. National expert to provide trend data for the last five years. 
E2. Government administrative capacity 
Rationale. For inspections to work, governments must have an 
administrative system to carry them out, a sampling procedure that is rel-
evant to the needs of the country, an adequate budget and qualified per-
sonnel. These elements are all necessary if the inspections are to be an 
effective means of law enforcement. 
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Guidelines for national experts. National experts must exercise 
their own judgement, although that judgment should be based on the fol-
lowing issues: 
(a) adequacy of personnel and budgets compared to the number of 
workplaces; 
(b) sampling schemes: the frequency and adequacy of inspections; 
(c) coverage of establishments; 
(d) data on violations. 
Many countries provide sampling schemes and annual data on the 
number of establishments inspected, so the necessary information is avail-
able. The national experts can use two primary categories: 
Category A Where the national expert feels, based on the above four sets of data, that 
governments have the institutional capacity to monitor labour laws in their 
country. 
Category B Where the national expert feels that the institutional capacity is lacking. 
F. Rights and practice in the informal sector 
It is essential to develop social dialogue indicators for the informal 
sector, given the growing size and centrality of this sector in the world. 
However, the diversity of occupational categories, and a lack of "descrip-
tors" of the sector make it very difficult to decide what information is 
relevant to the creation of indicators. Thus, our approach focuses on basic 
general information, although some research would make it possible to 
create more detailed measures. 
F l . Freedom of association 
Rationale. The right to form associations and/or unions is a pre-
condition to social dialogue. There are several instances where unemployed 
workers have formed unions (e.g. Philippines), or where informal sector 
workers have formed associations (although not always for collective bar-
gaining purposes). The informal sector also includes a sizeable number of 
agricultural workers, and there are organizations of peasants in some coun-
tries. Broadly, the alternatives range from countries in which all workers 
(including informal sector workers) have the right to form associations or 
unions, countries in which the law is silent on the issue (associations and 
unions may or may not exist in practice), and countries where freedom of 
association is specifically prohibited or excluded for informal sector workers. 
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Guideline for national experts. The national expert simply reports 
whether the country recognizes the right or not. Thus 
Category A Countries which expressly allow freedom of association for the informal 
sector. 
Category B Countries where the law is silent on the issue and the right exists in practice. 
Category C Countries where the right is de jure or de facto prohibited. 
F2. Collective bargaining and individual disputes 
Rationale. While bargaining does take place either formally or infor-
mally in many parts of the informal sector, it is not clear that the right to 
bargain is uniformly available to informal sector workers in all countries. 
And in many cases, particularly in small establishments that are outside 
the scope of legislation regarding collective bargaining, workers can exer-
cise their social dialogue rights individually through regular or specially 
created dispute resolution channels, by raising individual disputes. It is 
also desirable to know which types of informal sector workers have these 
rights. Thus, the guidelines for national experts are based on the varia-
tion in these approaches, but also stress the need to provide information 
on the types of workers in the informal sector who have or do not have 
these rights. 
Guidelines for national experts. 
Category A Where collective bargaining is protected and encouraged in the informal 
sector generally. 
Category B Where collective bargaining is permitted only for some occupations within 
the informal sector, or for some types of informal establishments (national 
experts to state which occupations/establishments). 
Category C Where all informal sector workers may raise individual disputes even though 
collective negotiations are not applicable. 
Category D Where only some occupations or employees in certain types of establish-
ment may raise individual disputes even though collective negotiations are 
not applicable. National expert to provide detail on the occupations and types 
of establishment. 
Category E Where the rights are granted in categories A-D, but only in respect of certain 
subjects (e.g. retrenchment). 
Category F Where no collective or individual rights are granted to the informal sector. 
F3. Unionization 
Rationale. It is important to examine the practice of freedom of 
association in the informal sector. There are two problems here; the 
variation across occupations and the lack of data. For example, in India 
construction workers are in the informal sector. However, construction 
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workers in many states are heavily unionized. It is unrealistic to hope for 
estimates of union density in each occupation in the informal sector. What 
the national expert can do, however, is to list the occupations which are 
unionized and perhaps estimate (however roughly) the density of unioniza-
tion in the informal sector. 
Guidelines for national experts. Report on the informal sector 
occupations that are unionized, and estimate union density using these 
figures. 
F4. Other informal sector organizations 
Rationale. There are numerous informal sector organizations that 
provide some degree of voice for workers on a range of issues. In the 
Indian state of Kerala, for example, organizations of contract workers in 
the beedi industry have associations which manage social security funds. 
Cooperatives and NGOs are also active in the informal sector. It is not 
possible to devise guidelines for national experts with regard to this point. 
Instead the national data sheets should allow space for experts to report 
on unusual practices to enable some cross-national learning about informal 
sector work. 
5. Implications and costs of this methodology 
To summarize, the methodology adopted in this paper focuses on 
the creation of national social dialogue data sheets for each country. The 
guidelines for national experts mitigate the problems with subjective inter-
pretation, since they provide a basis on which judgements can be made. 
The national experts are expected to provide data to support their judge-
ment in many situations. The methodology involves a degree of trans-
parency in that the NSDDS will be made available on the web so that 
interested parties can discuss the results and argue over the conclusions 
reached, which also helps to limit the degree of subjectivity. This trans-
parency is important in itself, since it will promote discussion and raise 
awareness of social dialogue issues. However, it is impossible to completely 
eliminate subjective judgements from this process. 
The NSDDS approach has several implications. 
Construct validity. This approach identifies all the relevant issues 
(rights, practices, outcomes) connected with the operation of social dia-
logue. Thus, it certainly points to the most appropriate concepts and 
the most relevant measures for evaluating progress on social dialogue as 
defined currently by the ILO. 
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Reliability. There are several ways in which this methodology pro-
motes reliability in data collection. First, it forces national experts to con-
sider various issues as they make their judgements. Second, the guidelines 
are clear enough to enable any national expert to collect the data. Third, 
the national experts often have to report data to back their assessments. 
Fourth, there is a high degree of internal consistency. Yet, reliability is not 
perfect. There is no guarantee that two national experts will agree on how 
collective bargaining institutions actually work in practice. It is true that 
reliability would be better if we had measures that were more "objective", 
but this would reduce construct validity. Because social dialogue is a com-
plex phenomenon some degree of qualitative judgement and interpretation 
is necessary for a realistic and meaningful assessment. 
Relationship to past approaches. The indicators developed for 
the NSDDS are based on comparative research and earlier approaches 
to measuring freedom of association and collective bargaining. However, 
there is an important departure. A large number of measures have been 
used in previous research on tripartism as it operates in Europe, but tri-
partism is not well developed in the rest of the world (75 per cent of global 
population), and the NSDDS should not be overly biased towards Euro-
pean models. The indicators are designed to help countries make progress 
on social dialogue, and it is the rest of the world rather than Western 
Europe that needs to make the most progress. 
Comprehensiveness. Although these indicators describe social dia-
logue in the formal sector very well, more work is needed on alterna-
tive approaches such as codes of conduct, certification and the informal 
sector. Codes of conduct and certification schemes are relatively new phe-
nomena, and information is not yet available on the variation in how these 
approaches work. Some basic sets of information on these issues have 
therefore been developed for the NSDDS, with the expectation that more 
assessable indicators can be devised in future. 
Comparative ranking. The essence of this approach is to yield 
national data sheets that provide a composite picture of the state of social 
dialogue. There is space for categorization, actual trend data, examples, 
judgements and so forth. It is possible to reorder the categories so that they 
can be scored (or ranked). However, not all the indicators are amenable 
to scoring. Thus, it is not possible to arrive at country rankings if all the 
indicators are used. If ranking is the goal, then a smaller subset of indica-
tors could be used, but that would provide a less comprehensive picture 
of social dialogue. Nevertheless, comparing a national social dialogue data 
sheet over two points in time will allow policy makers to judge whether a 
particular country has made, or is making, progress on social dialogue. 
Costs and frequency of data collection. An important issue in col-
lecting data is the cost involved. The approach advocated by this paper 
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of using qualitative data prepared by national experts not only captures 
the processes of social dialogue, but is cost efficient. Assuming that one 
national expert per country is engaged, and that data are collected and 
reported for 100 countries, the NSDDS would cost about US$500,000; i.e. 
much less than the same number of national surveys. This means that such 
data can be collected more frequently. Given the interest in monitoring 
progress, one suggestion is to have national experts prepare NSSDS for 
each country once in 4 or 5 years. Another way to reduce the cost would 
be to engage regional experts who would cover several countries, or to use 
ILO country experts (see below). 
Nature and availability of national experts. The above figures 
assume that there are national experts in each country. That is not neces-
sarily a valid assumption, as several countries do not have an academic dis-
cipline of industrial relations (hence no national experts). However, there 
are two other sources of national expertise. One is within the ILO. The 
ILO regional offices have staff who are experts on social dialogue in cer-
tain groups of countries and who are perfectly capable of collecting data 
according to the template provided in this paper. The second source of 
expertise is research on comparative industrial relations; there are scholars 
who focus on these issues in a set of countries or a region. Thus, it may 
not be necessary to identify a national expert in every country, as long as 
regional experts are available. A combination of ILO experts and com-
parative industrial relations scholars would be appropriate. 
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